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The Supreme Court’s last 30 years of Federal Indian Law: Looking
for Equilibrium or Supremacy?
Alex Tallchief Skibine*
Since 1831, Indian tribes have been viewed as Domestic Dependent Nations located
within the geographical boundaries of the United States.1 Although Chief Justice John Marshall
acknowledged that Indian nations had a certain amount of sovereignty,2 the exact extent of such
sovereignty as well as the place of tribes within the federal system, has remained ill-defined. This
Article examines what has been the role of the Supreme Court in integrating Indian nations as
the third Sovereign within our federalist system.3 Although I have written on similar topics in
the past,4 this Article looks at this issue by surveying and examining the Court’s Indian law record
in the last 30 years.
The Court initially deferred questions concerning the status of tribes within the political
system of the United States to Congress,5 whose policy towards Tribes changed with the times.6
Initially, Indian nations were viewed as political entities existing outside of our political system
and most of the relations between the United States and the tribes were governed through
treaties.7 Things started changing after 1871, the year a law was enacted prohibiting any more
treaties with Indian nations. 8 Soon after, the United States embarked on a policy aimed at
S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like to thank
George Skibine for his editorial review of this Article and Professor Kirsten Carlson for providing critical
comments and suggestions on a previous draft of this Article.
1
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. 1 (1831). Although this Article will use the terms “Indian nations”
and “Indian tribes” interchangeably, the United States Constitution refers only to Indian “tribes.” The use
of the term “tribes” in the Constitution played a key role in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia where the Court
held that Indian tribes were neither States of the Union or foreign nations for the purpose of invoking the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution.
2
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
3
Describing Indian nations as “the third sovereign” may have originated initially with Justice O’Connor.
See Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L.J. 1
(1997).
4
See Alex T. Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the
Dependency Paradigm, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 667 (2006), and Alex T. Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian
Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47 (2004).
5
See for instance United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553
(1903).
6
See Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2012 Ed., pp. 23-108.
7
See Vine Deloria Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 Ariz. L. Rev.
963 (1996).
8
Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 466 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 71 (2000) (stating “No Indian
nation of tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an
independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”)
*
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assimilating individual Indians into the mainstream of American society.9 There was no idea at
that time to integrate Indian nations into our political system as sovereign governments. The
expectations were that Indian tribes, as political entities would soon disappear.10 The current
policy, however, is to promote tribal self-determination and recognize tribes as self-governing
entities with enough sovereignty to have a government-to-government relationship with the
United States.11
The Supreme Court’s record of decided cases in the last thirty years indicates that the
Court has had difficulties upholding the federal policy of respecting tribal sovereignty and
encouraging tribal self-government. For instance, in an influential article, David Getches
documented that during the first 15 terms of the Rehnquist Court, Indian tribal interests only
won about 23% of Federal Indian law cases at the Supreme Court from 1986 until 2001.12 As the
title of his article indicated, Getches believed that the dismal tribal record was influenced by the
Court’s agenda to promote states’ rights, a color-blind agenda, and mainstream values. Getches’
findings were later supplemented by Professor Matthew Fletcher who analyzed the Cert process
at the Supreme Court and found that while very few tribal petitions were granted, a
disproportionately large number of petitions filed by non-tribal interests aimed at overturning
decisions favorable to these tribal interests were granted.13 In a more recent article, Professor
Bethany Berger updated the numbers found by Getches by looking at cases decided between
1990 and 2016.14 While confirming that the percentage of tribal wins from 1990 until 2015 had
not improved since Getches’s 2001 article, she saw an improvement in the 2015-16 term that
perhaps indicated that tribal interests could find some light at the end of this anti-tribal tunnel.
In this article, I start with an in-depth examination of the last 30 years of Indian law
decisions.15 Starting where Professor Berger left off, after first categorizing the cases between
victories and losses during this time, Part II divides the cases into four categories: Federal
common law, statutory interpretation, constitutional law, and procedural law. The cases are
then further divided into four general areas within the field of Federal Indian law: 1.
See Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law (2012 Edition) at pp. 71-79.
See Kathryn E Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns: Tribes, Popular Originalism, and the Supreme Court,
57 St. Louis U. L. J. 297 (2013).
11
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121, 135-136
(2006).
12
David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice
and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 280-281 (2001).
13
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian
Tribes, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 933 (2009).
14
Bethany Berger Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court, Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker,
Bryant, Dollar General, and Beyond, (forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law Review.) (Hereinafter
Hope for Indian Tribes)
15
My survey starts with the 1987-1988 term and ends with the 2016-2017 term. For another survey, see
Lawrence R. Baca, 40 Years of U.S. Supreme Court Indian Law Cases, 62 –APR Fed. Law 18 (2015)(listing all
the cases from 1976 until 2014, classifying them as tribal victories or not, and commenting on the Justices
who wrote some of the cases).
9

10
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Political/sovereign rights, 2. Economic Rights (treaty/property rights), 3. Rights derived from the
Indian trust doctrine, and 4. Cultural/Religious rights. Part II ends by assessing the trends in the
evolution of the cases and concludes by formulating general principles that can be derived from
the tribal win/loss record in these different classifications.
In Part III, I focus on the interaction between the Court and Congress concerning the
incorporation of tribes as third sovereigns within the federalist system. This Part first evaluates
Congress’s response to Supreme Court cases. It then looks at the Court’s response to
congressional legislation. In a noted article, Professors Frickey and Eskridge put forth the thesis
that in deciding cases, the Court is evaluating what Congress and the Executive branch think
about the broader issues involved in such cases and responds accordingly, in effect trying to reach
a legal “equilibrium” among the three branches of government. As stated by the authors:
Positive political theory claims that lawmaking institutions are rational, self-interested,
interdependent, and affected by the sequence of institutional interaction. When viewed
through this lens, law is... an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces or
institutions. Congress, the executive, and the courts engage in purposive behavior. Each
branch seeks to promote its vision of the public interest, but only as that vision can be
achieved within a complex, interactive setting in which each organ of government is both
cooperating with and competing with the other organs. To achieve its goals, each branch
also acts strategically, calibrating its actions in anticipation of how other institutions
would respond.16
Yet when it comes to Federal Indian Law, one has to wonder if the Supreme Court does
not have another agenda on the table. One that does not try to reach an equilibrium about
incorporating tribes as the third sovereign within our federalism but instead aims to impose the
Court’s own terms on how Indian tribes should be integrated into our Federalist system.17 For
instance, in two other articles, Professor Frickey noted that one of the reason Tribal sovereignty
was under attack at the Court was that the Court was abandoning the exceptionalism of John
Marshall’s foundational Indian law cases,18 and was instead adopting a new “federal common
law” for what he called, “our age of colonialism.”19
In the 1930’s Congress made the decision to integrate tribes into our political system as
quasi-sovereign entities.20 However, most tribes were isolated geographically and lacked the
financial resources to have much of an impact on non-Indians or outside Indian Country. In the
last thirty years, things have changed. Tribes are now more meaningful actors, economically and
politically. This could explain the Court’s new aggressiveness in taking on Indian cases and, some
may argue, judicial activism in modifying foundational principles established when tribes were
16
17

See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 28-29 (1994).

………………………………………….

Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 433 (2005)
Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal
Authority over Non-Members, 109 Yale L.J. 1 (1999).
20
See Felix Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2012 Edition, at pp. 79-84.
18
19
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not much of a factor in the economic and political life of the United States.21 As once noted by
Professor Judith Resnick, when issues become important enough to the government, it will
remind “the dominated group of its dependence upon the larger collective and works to bring
the smaller group into compliance with federal norms.”22 Federal Courts will then impose federal
rules of decisions on either state or tribal courts.23 Perhaps this is the reason why Philip Frickey
was right when he observed that the Court was in the process of “flattening” federal Indian law
into the broader American public law by importing general constitutional and sub-constitutional
value into the field.“24
Some scholars have argued that Congress has given up its leading role in formulating
federal Indian policy.25 Others have noted that Congress is in fact much more active in enacting
laws affecting or concerning Indian nations than previously thought. 26 Part III ends with
evaluating the role of the Court’s use of Federal Common law. I argue here that perhaps the
Court is not trying to reach an equilibrium with Congress but is looking for a different kind of
equilibrium. In other words, the Court is not attempting to achieve a balance between Congress
and itself, but is aiming to establish what the Court perceives should be the proper equilibrium
between tribal interests on one hand and the non-Indian/state interests on the other.
PART II: DISSECTING THE RECORD: WHAT THE NUMBERS TELL US:
As reflected in Appendix A, the survey takes into account 66 cases.27 The survey shows that
of these 66 cases, tribal interests lost 47.5 cases and won 18.5.28 This represent a tribal win ratio

On foundational principles of federal Indian law and how the Court is changing them, see David H.
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84
Cal L. Rev. 1573 (1996).
22
Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes and the Federal Courts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 756
(1989).
23
Id., at 754 (Stating that federal courts have allowed Tribes unrestricted authority on certain intra tribal
issues such as tribal membership dispute because these “are not decisions of national importance.” Id.,
at 754.
24
Philip P. Frickey, Our Age of Colonialism, supra at note 18, at pp.73-77.
25
See Fletcher, Federal Indian Policy, supra at note 11.
26
See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. Of Col. L. Rev. 77 (2015).
27
Not included in the total number is South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004). The case involved an Indian tribe and a number of environmental
organizations bringing a case against a Florida water management district for violation of the Clean Water
Act. The case was remanded for more factual findings. I do not regard this case as a Federal Indian Law
case. It is an environmental law case where one of the plaintiffs happened to be an Indian tribe. I have
also not included Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 117 S. Ct. 286 (1996). The case involved a
challenge to the Interior Secretary’s decision to take land in trust for a Tribe. Over a strong dissent by
Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas, the Court granted cert, vacated the decision below, and order the
case remanded to the Secretary (GVR) so that a new decision could made using newly issued regulations
28
The half point comes from the fact that in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990), the
Tribe won half the case (Tribal jurisdiction over non-member property in the “closed” part of the
21
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of only 28% . However, that percentage is still higher than the numbers found by David Getches
in his 2001 study (23%) summarizing the first 17 years of the Rehnquist Court,29 and just a bit
higher than that found by Professor Berger in her more recent study.30
A. THE RECORD BASED ON THE TYPE OF LAW USED TO DECIDE THE CASES.
This part divides the cases into four categories: Federal common law, statutory/treaty
interpretation, constitutional law, and procedural law.31 The cases are divided into those four
categories because when it comes to Federal Indian law, all the relevant cases can be fitted into
these categories. In spite of strong arguments from various scholars that international law should
provide the rules of decisions in many Indian law cases, the Court has unfortunately not yet
followed that recommendation. 32 Whether a case is decided using federal common law or
constitutional law is normally easy to tell although that issue was the subject of at least one
Supreme Court decision in Federal Indian law.33
1. Federal Common law decisions: 28.5 cases.
The survey indicates that there was a total of 28.5 cases decided on Federal common law
grounds. The half point is the result of considering California v. Cabazon Band as half a statutory
interpretation case and half a federal common law case.34 Of these federal common law cases,
tribal interests won 9 and lost 19.5 cases. This represent a tribal win ratio of 31.5%.
The tribal percentage of wins may look better than it might have been because three of
the tribal wins were against the Oklahoma Tax Commission and were perhaps the result of an
overly aggressive anti–tribal agenda on behalf of that Commission.35 Also, after much debate, I
did include Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 36 in this survey as a tribal win although,
perhaps, the case is better described as not a loss rather than an outright win. In that case, the
reservation), but lost the other half of the case (no tribal jurisdiction over non-member property in the
“open” section.)
29
See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra at note 12.
30
See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note 14. Professor Berger’s percentage of tribal wins from
1990 until 2016 is 27.3%. The minor difference can be explained by the slightly different scope of the
years covered in the two surveys, 1990-2016 for hers instead of 1987-2017 for mine. The difference in
years considered resulted in a difference in the number of cases included: 53 in her study, 66 for mine.
31
This last category is in effect is a residual one containing all cases not fitting in the first three categories.
32
See Robert A. Williams Jr., Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal
History of Racism in America (2005), Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev.
31 (1996).
33
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
34
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
35
See Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), Oklahoma Tax Commission, v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450 (1995). It is noteworthy that these are the only three cases Indian nations won fighting the
states’ attempts to tax activities in Indian Country using the Indian preemption doctrine after the Court
issued its 1989 decision in Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
36
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
5

Supreme Court split 4-4 thereby affirming the decision below that was in favor of tribal civil
jurisdiction over a non-member. Experts seem to agree, however, that if Justice Scalia had still
been alive, his previous record and questioning during the oral argument indicate that, in all
likelihood, he would have voted against the tribal interests.37
Of the other wins, two upheld tribal sovereign immunity,38 one allowed a tribe to sue the
United States for breach of trust in the management of trust assets,39 and half of Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes40 allowed tribal jurisdiction over non-members in the “closed” parts of the
reservation. Two of the more meaningful wins came early on. In California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, the tribe was allowed to conduct certain gaming activities free of state
regulation, 41 and in Iowa Mutual v. Laplante, 42 the Court reaffirmed and extended the
requirement that non-members being sued in tribal court should first have to exhaust their tribal
court remedies before challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal court.
The tribal loss category can be divided into four subcategories: 1. Tribal Jurisdiction over
non-members, 2. State taxation inside Indian reservations, 3. Cases interpreting the trust
doctrine, and 4. Cases involving both tribal and state sovereign immunity.
Tribal interests lost 6.5 cases out of 7.5 cases involving tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.43 Tribal interests also lost six cases involving the states’ attempts to tax activities on
Indian land or Indian reservations.44 Judicial Interpretation of the Trust doctrine also proved
detrimental to tribes as tribal interests lost 4 cases. Two cases involved the Navajo Nation
attempts to sue the United States for breach of trust.45 Another one involved a tribal attempt to

See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note14.
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 124 U.S. 2024 (2014) and Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing
technologies, 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
39
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
40
492 U.S. 408 (1990).
41
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
42
480 U.S. 9 (1987).
43
The six cases are: Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993),
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), and Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316
(2008). The tribes also lost half of Brendale v. Confederated tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).
44
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Department of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S.
679 (1994), Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 (1998), Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze
Construction, 526 U.S. 32 (1999), City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), and Wagnon
v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
45
United States v. Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). and United States v. Navajo Nation II, 556 U.S.
287 (2009)(both cases finding that no statutes allowed the Navajo Nation the right to sue the United states
for breach of trust). While both cases could be classified as involving statutory construction in that the
issue was whether statutes could fairly be interpreted as allowing a breach of trust action against the
United States for mismanagement of trust assets, I view them as being more about applying the Indian
trust doctrine to the interpretation of statutes than just cases about statutory interpretation.
37
38
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apply the trust doctrine to the Freedom of Information Act.46 Perhaps the most important one,
in a jurisprudential sense, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,47 held that the trust doctrine
could not allow the Tribe access to documents in possession of the United States that was both
the trustee for the plaintiff Tribe but also the defendant in the case. The importance of the case
stems from language throughout the Opinion indicating that, absent specific statutory language,
the general law of trust could not be imported to define the duties of the United States as trustee
for the tribes because its role as trustee was so different than that of a regular trustee.
Tribal interests also lost three cases dealing with sovereign immunity. Two cases involved
tribal sovereign Immunity,48 and one the sovereign immunity of the states.49
2. Statutory Interpretation cases: 21.5 cases.
Among the 66 cases, 21.5 involved statutory/treaty interpretation. Among those, the
tribal interests lost 15 and won 6.5 cases or 30.2% of all the cases in this category. It is
interesting to note that beside Cabazon (counting for half a case), 50 all other six tribal wins
involved interpretations of Indian specific legislation. Two involved interpretation of the Indian
Self Determination Act.51 Two more involved treaty and quasi treaty interpretations.52 The oldest
case decided in this category involved interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act,53 and the
last decided case, Nebraska v. Parker, involved federal legislation which was alleged to have
disestablished an Indian reservation.54
Among the tribal losses, ten cases involved Indian specific legislation, and five involved
general type of legislation. The Indian specific legislation included an interpretation of the Indian

Department of Interior v. Klamath River Water Users, 530 U.S. 495 (2000)(Trust doctrine does not create
a tribal exception to FOIA.
47
564 U.S. 162 (2011).
48
C.L. Enterprise v. Citizens Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 422 (2001)( Holding that the Tribe
had waived its immunity) and Lewis v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017)(Refusing to extend the sovereign
immunity of the Tribe to tribal employees committing torts off the reservation while on tribal assignment.)
49
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)(Refusing to extend the Ex parte Young Doctrine to allow
the tribe to sue the State.)
50
480 U.S. 202 (1987)(interpreting P.L. 280 as not allowing state civil regulatory jurisdiction over Indian
gaming).
51
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012), Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631
(2005). Interestingly, in the seven years separating these two cases, tribal interests did not win once at
the Supreme Court.
52
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), and Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S.
262 (2001). I called this last one a quasi-treaty case because the Court had to interpret an 1891 Act that
ratified two previous tribal agreements made with the Coeur D’Alene Tribe. The Court held that Congress
intended to reserve all submerged land under lakes and rivers when it legislatively ratified these two
previous tribal agreements.
53
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
54
136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
46
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Child Welfare Act,55 a tax provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,56 an interpretation of
the Indian Reorganization Act,57 and an interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act (ANCSA).58 In addition, two cases interpreted the General Allotment Act and the Burke Act,
to allow state taxation of Indian owned fee patented lands. 59 Two other cases interpreted Acts
opening up reservations for non-Indian settlers as terminating reservation status.60 Another
case interpreted a Kansas act as conferring criminal jurisdiction on the State.61 Finally, in Hawaii
v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs,62 the Court held that when Congress enacted the Native Hawaiian
Apology Resolution, it did not intend to strip the State of Hawaii of its sovereign power to alienate
lands which had previously been ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii the United States and then
transferred to the State.
Among the five losses involving general and not Indian specific legislation, one case dealt
with interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Quiet Title Act.63 Another one
held that Indian tribes were not “persons” for the purposes of being allowed to sue under Section
1983.64 One case held that claims brought under the Price-Anderson Act required federal court
jurisdiction so that tribal exhaustion of remedies could not be mandated.65 Another one held that
the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 conveyed everything to the non-Indian surface patentees
except the coal which had been reserved to the United States. Therefore, it was these patentees
and not the Tribe who owned the coal bed methane gas under the land.66 Finally one case dealt
with the rights of Alaska Natives under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,
(ANILCA).67
3. Constitutional Law: 11 cases.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
57
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009)(holding that only tribes under federal jurisdiction as of 1934
could benefit from section 5 of the IRA, 25 U.S.C. 465, allowing the Secretary of Interior to take land into
trust for the benefit of Indians.
58
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)(Holding that sections of the law reserving lands
for Indians in fee simple did not create “Indian Country” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151).
59
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S.
103 (1998) (Holding that when Congress makes Indian or tribal land freely alienable, it clearly signifies an
intent to allow state taxation of such lands.)
60
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
61
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993).
62
556 U.S. 163 (2009)
63
Mach-E-B-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 219 (2012)
64
Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
65
El Paso Natural Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
66
Amoco Production v. Southern Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
67
Amoco Production v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
55
56
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Cases decided on constitutional grounds were even more detrimental to tribal interests
than the two previously discussed areas. There was a total of 11 cases. The tribes only won two
cases and lost nine. This amounts only to an 18.1% rate of success.
The major tribal win, and some may say, the most significant win of all during this period,
was United States v. Lara.68 The Court in Lara held that decisions like Duro v. Reina where the
Court held that Tribes had been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-members,
were decisions based on Federal Common law and not constitutional law. As such, these
decisions could be reversed or modified by Congress.69
The other tribal win was United States v. Bryant,70 holding that convictions obtained in
tribal courts could be counted for the purpose of enhancing sentences in federal courts even if
the defendants in tribal courts did not benefit from the assistance of counsel. Although the case
is a win as far as recognizing the legitimacy of tribal courts within the federal system, some may
argue that it is a loss for those who think the assistance of counsel is crucial to ensure a fair
conviction.71
Among the nine losses, three cases involved Indian/tribal interests but were not, strictly
speaking, Indian cases. Matal v. Tam is a non-Indian case with ramifications for cases challenging
the use of Indian mascots. 72 Employment Division v. Smith involved the use of Peyote as a
sacrament in Native American religious practices but the constitutional principle devised by the
Court to decide the case affected all religions.73 The third case, Rice v. Cayetano, dealt with the
special status of Native Hawaiians under federal law.74
Six tribal losses were truly Indian cases. Hodel v. Irving,75 and Babbitt v. Youpee, 76 struck
as unconstitutional certain sections of the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Lyng v. Northwest
Cemetery held that just about all federal actions negatively impacting Native American Sacred
541 U.S. 193 (2004).
For a general discussion of the case, see Alex T. Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the
Dialectic of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47 (2004).
70
136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
71
For a discussion of the issue, see Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of a Crime:
A Tribal and Congressional Imperative, 18 Mich. J. Race & L. 317, 358 (2013).
68
69

137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)(holding that the use of arguably racially offensive words in Trademarks is
protected by the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.) The Holding in Matal v. Tan doomed the
efforts of Indians to force the National Football League to abandon the “Redskins” trademark, see ProFootball v, Blackhorse, 112 F.Supp.3d 439 (2015).
73
494 U.S. 872 (1990)(holding that criminal laws of general applicability that only incidentally impose
burdens on the exercise of religion cannot be challenged under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.)
74
528 U.S. 495 (2000)(holding that a law restricting voting in a State election to “Native Hawaiians” was a
racial classification and therefore unconstitutional under the 15th Amendment.
75
481 U.S. 704 (1987).
76
519 U.S. 234 (1997).
72
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sites located on Federal land could not be challenged under the Free Exercise Clause because
such actions did not substantially burden the religious practices of Native American
practitioners. 77 United States v. Cherokee Nation, 78 involved the extent of the United States’
navigational servitude under the Commerce Clause. The last two cases, Blatchford v. Native
Village of Noatak,79 and Seminole Tribe v. Florida,80 prevented Indian nations from suing states
in federal courts because of the states’ sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of
the United States Constitution.81
4. Administrative/Civil Procedure Law: 5 cases.
There are only five cases in this category. Although tribal interests only won one of these
cases, representing only a 20% win rate, this is by far the least important category since the cases
here, while very important to the particular parties involved in each case, do not represent
important precedents concerning the status of Indian Nations within the federal system.
The one win was in Arizona v. California.82 The case was also the most meaningful among
the five cases in this category. The decision held that the claim of the tribes and the United States
to more water from the Colorado River was not precluded by previous decrees, nor was it barred
under Res Judicata principles.
Among the four losses, one case involved a tribe losing the right to sue in the Federal Court
of Claims because the Tribe had already filed a substantially similar case in a federal district
court.83 Another one held that the Administrative Procedure Act did not prevent the right of an
Executive Agency to reprogram monies from one Indian program to another.84 In Oklahoma Tax
Comm. v. Graham,85 the Court remanded a case which had been decided in the tribe’s favor but
only because the case had been improperly removed to federal court. Finally, in Menominee v.
United States,86 the Court held that the statute of limitation contained in the Contract Dispute
Act was applicable to a contract dispute between a tribe and the United States involving the
Indian Self Determination Act.
485 U.S. 439 (1988). For a more in-depth analysis of the case, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a
Balanced Approached for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 Mich. J. of Race &Law 269,
279-288 (2012).
78
480 U.S. 700 (1987).
79
501 U.S. 775 (1991).
80
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
81
The Eleventh Amendment provides as follows: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
77

530 U.S. 392 (2000).
United States v. Tohono O’Odham, 563 U.S. 307 (2011).
84
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
85
489 U.S. 838 (1989).
86
136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
82
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5. Assessing the record based on the type of law used to decide the cases.
Since 1988, tribes are most likely to lose cases based on constitutional or Procedural law although
as stated earlier, the cases based on procedural law are not that meaningful. Of the six losses in
strictly Indian cases involving constitutional law, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 87 while undoubtedly
very important to Indian interests, involved much more of a Federal versus State conflict than a
Tribal versus State one. United States v. Cherokee Nation involved tribal interests but was not
strictly speaking, decided on constitutional law dealing specifically with Indians.88 It is debatable
whether Irving and Youpee are, strictly speaking, losses for tribal interests as the Court held that
Congress could not without adequate compensation make individual Indians’ minimal interest in
land escheat to the tribes.89 This leaves Lyng,90 the sacred site decision, and Village of Noatak
holding that even though states can sue each other, Indian tribes cannot sue states because the
tribes were not part of the “Plan of the Convention,”91 as the two most meaningful constitutional
losses involving the rights of Indian nations within the federal system. As stated earlier, United
States v. Lara is the most meaningful tribal win in this category.92
Refusing to use constitutional law to integrate Indian tribes as the third sovereign within our
federalist system is not a dereliction of judicial duties. While Indian tribes are acknowledged in
the Constitution as political entities sovereign enough to have their own commerce with the
United States,93 the extent of the Indian nations’ sovereignty is not defined.
The tribes’ chance of winning cases decided under federal common law which stands at 28% is
not as good as winning cases based on statutory construction which have a 31.7% winning rate.
Within the statutory construction category, tribal interests have the best chance of winning cases
dealing with interpretation of Indian specific legislation as tribes won six of the sixteen cases in
this area, or 37.5% of the cases. However, arguably the two most important statutory
interpretation cases in this thirty-year period were losses in cases involving Indian specific
legislation: The interpretation of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 in Carcieri,94 and the case
interpreting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 in Village of Venetie.95
The Court has historically left the role of governing the relations with the Indian nations
to Congress, confirming that position relatively recently in United States v. Lara,96 a pivotal case
517 U.S. 44 (1996). See discussion at notes 74-80.
480 U.S. 700 (1987) (determining the extent of the United States navigational servitude in the “waters
of the United States.”
89
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). See note 201, infra.
90
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
91
501 U.S. 775 (1991).
92
541 U.S. 193 (2004). See discussion, supra, at notes 66-673-64.
93
The Commerce Clause, Article II, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress
shall have the power ….to regulate Commerce…. with the Indian Tribes;”
94
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
95
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
96
541 U.S. 193 (2004).
87
88
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decided in 2004. So one would think that most of the cases would be about statutes defining the
relationships between the tribes, the states and the federal government. Perhaps surprisingly,
the Court uses Federal Common Law more than any other type of law when deciding cases
involving tribal interests. Among the cases decided on Federal Common law grounds, tribes only
won in the area of tribal sovereign immunity, and fought successfully against assertion of tax
jurisdiction by Oklahoma in the three cases involving the Oklahoma Tax Commission. Otherwise,
tribal interests lost all six cases involving assertion of tribal jurisdiction over non-members. The
tribes also lost six cases involving state taxation of activities in Indian Country. Clearly, the Court
used federal common law mostly to protect non-members against tribal sovereignty and to
promote state sovereignty (through taxation) inside Indian Country. “Indian Country” is a term
of art defined in 18 U.S.C. 1151. It includes all lands within Indian reservations as well as land
held in trust or restricted fee by the United States for the benefit of Indians, and land set aside
by the United States for Dependent Indian Communities.97
B. THE RECORD WHEN CASES ARE DIVIDED ACCORDING TO SUBJECT MATTER.
In this section, instead of classifying the cases according to the type of law used to make
the decision, the cases are classified according to four subject matter areas affecting tribal rights:
Sovereign/Political Rights, Economic/Property Rights, Rights derived from the trust Relationship,
and Cultural/Religious Rights. For the purposes of this section, I have not included Lincoln v.
Vigil,98 or Oklahoma v. Graham.99 Although both are tribal losses, albeit relatively unimportant
ones in the procedural category, they did not easily fit in any of the four categories named above.
1. Sovereign/Political rights: 38.5 cases.
This category concerns cases involving the sovereign rights of Indians tribes, either to assume
jurisdiction over non-members, or claim sovereign immunity when being sued in state or federal
court. The section also concerns the sovereign rights of states to assume jurisdiction in Indian
Country, or claim sovereign immunity when being sued by tribes. Also included are cases
involving the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
Most of the cases decided by the Court concerning tribal interests involve, in some fashion or
another, the political or sovereign rights of the tribes, 38.5 out of 66 cases. Cabazon is being
counted as half a political rights case and half an economic rights case since it denied the states
the jurisdiction to regulate gaming in Indian Country . Brendale is being considered as half a loss
and half a win for the tribes.100 The record, therefore, indicates that tribal interests suffered 26.5
losses while winning 12 cases (30.2%).
The 26.5 losses can be divided among cases extending or recognizing state power over Indian
Country or Indian Affairs and cases that reduced tribal power.
97

18 U.S.C. 1151.

508 U.S. 192 (2011)
489 U.S. 838 (1989).
100
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).
98
99
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13 cases can be described as allowing State jurisdiction. While eight of these cases dealt with
the authority of states to tax,101 one extended state criminal jurisdiction in Kansas,102 and three
others diminished the extent of Indian country, thereby extending state general authority over
these areas.103 Finally one case narrowed the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
implicitly extending state authority over such cases.104
13.5 cases can be described as negatively impacting tribal sovereignty: 7.5 cases denied tribal
civil or criminal jurisdiction over non-members.105Five cases either prevented tribes from suing
states,106 or refused to extend tribal sovereign immunity.107 Finally one case refused to limit
election to the State Commission on Native Hawaiian affairs to Native Hawaiians.108
Tribal interests won 12 cases; 9 reinforced the sovereign rights of Indian tribes,109 while 3
negatively impacted state power by denying state taxing authority inside Indian Country.110

Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Department of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S.
679 (1994), Montana v. Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696 (1998), Arizona Department of Revenue v. Blaze
Construction, 526 U.S. 32 (1999), City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), Wagnon v.
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), County of Yakima v, Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S.
251 (1992), and Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
102
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993).
103
Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329
(1988), and Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
104
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (Holding that a biological father who never had
“custody” of his child is not eligible to take advantage of the Act to challenge an adoption proceeding.)
105
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Nevada v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353 (2001), Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008), Brendale
v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1980) El Paso Natural gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
106
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), , Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775
(1991), and Inyo County v. Paiute Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
107
Lewis v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017) (refusing to extend tribal sovereign immunity to employee
committing tort off the reservation by within the scope of his employment), C& L Enterprise v. Citizens
Band of Potawatomi, 532 U.S. 422 (2001) (finding an explicit waiver of tribal sovereign immunity).
101

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (1990).
The tribal wins in this area include California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), Iowa Mutual v.
Laplante, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016), Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S.
Ct. 1072 (2016), Dollar General v. Mississippi Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), Mississippi Band of Choctaw
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 124 U.S. 2024 (2014), Kiowa
Tribe v. Manufacturing technologies, 523 U.S. 751 (1998), United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), and
half of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1990).
110
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Sac and Fox nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993), Oklahoma Tax Commission, v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450 (1995).
108
109
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Among the 26.5 cases lost by the tribes, 15.5 were based on federal common law, 8 on
statutory interpretation, and 3 on constitutional law. Among the 11.5 tribal wins, 7.5 were based
on federal common law, 2 on statutory construction, and 2 on constitutional law.
Of the 8 statutory construction cases involving political rights that the tribes lost, 3 involved
the disestablishment of Indian country,111 one case interpreted a statute as conferring criminal
jurisdiction on a state,112 one was an ICWA case,113 one case dealt with Native Hawaiians,114 and
two cases allowed state taxation of fee patented land owned by Indians.115 The two cases won
by tribal interests include one of the earlier case in the covered period, Holyfield,116 interpreting
ICWA, and one of the very latest, Nebraska v. Parker,117 holding that an Indian reservation had
not been disestablished.
Although the numbers indicate that there was a disproportionate use of Federal Common
law in this area, 24 cases, and that the Tribes won 31.2% of cases based on Federal common law,
the odds of tribal interests winning cases based on statutory interpretation in this area was even
less: 2 out of 9 or 22%. In a somewhat curious twist, the tribes won 2 out of 5 or 40% of the cases
based on constitutional law affecting tribal political rights.118
2. Economic/property rights: 14.5 cases.
This section concerns tribal rights that can be more easily described as property rights or
economic rights. Not included in this category are cases where the Court was deciding the
continued existence of Indian Country. While such cases, such as the ones involving the
disestablishment of Indian reservations have certainly some economic or property aspect to
them, they are mostly about who, as between the tribes, the States or the federal government,
can assume jurisdiction over certain issues.
For these 14.5 cases, tribal interests won 5.5 cases and lost 9 which amounts to a 40% tribal
win rate. This indicates that Tribal interest are much more likely to win cases involving Tribal
economic rights (40%) than any other category of cases.

Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), South Dakota v.
Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
112
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993).
113
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
114
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009).
115
Cass County v. Leech Lake, 524 U.S. 103 (1998), County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251
(1992).
116
Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 20 (1989).
117
136 S. Ct. 1072 (2016).
118
The tribes won in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) and United States v. Brant, 136 S. Ct. 1954
(2016). Tribes lost in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (1990),
and Btalchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). The winning percentage here is curious
because overall, the tribes lost 9 of the 11 cases involving constitutional law. See discussion supra at notes
63-76.
111
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The tribal losses consist of an eclectic bunch not easily categorized. They range from an early
case dealing with the subsistence rights of Native Alaskans,119 to a case allowing federal taxation
of Indian gaming.120 Another three cases dealt with tribal attempts to confirm property rights in
minerals,121 or submerged land.122 Two other cases did not allow minimal individual interests in
land to escheat to tribes,123 while another applied the statute of limitations to a contract dispute
between a tribe and the United States.124 Finally, another case allowed the state of Hawaii to
continue the sale of lands that had been originally ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii.125
The most meaningful tribal victory here was California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians,126 which is included in this section as counting for half a case since it is also included for
half a case in the sovereign/political rights case in that it prevented state jurisdiction over Indian
gaming. Besides Cabazon, the tribal wins include two tribal contract disputes under the Indian
Self-Determination Act,127 two cases interpreting treaties or agreements with Indian Nations,128
and one Indian water rights case, Arizona v. California.129
3. Rights derived from the Federal-trust relationship: 8 cases.
There were 8 cases that, in some form or another, interpreted the trust relationship with
the United States.130 Tribal interests only won one case, a breach of trust claim against the United
States,131 and lost seven which amounts to only a 12.5% winning rate.
The tribal losses included three breach of trust claims. 132 In two other cases, tribes
attempted, without success, to apply the Indian trust doctrine to non-Indian statutes and
Amoco Production v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001)
121
Amoco Production v. Southern Ute tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
122
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 521 U.S. 261 (1997), United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
123
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
124
Menominee v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750 (2016).
125
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009).
126
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
127
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012), Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005).
128
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262
(2001).
129
530 U.S. 392 (2000).
130
Since 1831, when Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, described the Indian tribes as
domestic dependent nations whose relationship with the United States resembled that of a ward to its
guardian, 30 U.S. 1 at 17, the political relationship between the United States and the tribes has been
described as a trust relationship. Under that relationship, tribes are the beneficiary of the trust and the
United States is the trustee. For a comprehensive treatment of the trust doctrine see Mary Christina
Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev.
1471 (1994).
131
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
132
United States v. Navajo Nation, I and II, 537 U.S. 488 (2003), and 556 U.S. 287 (2009) (both cases finding
that no statutes allowed the Navajo Nation the right to sue the United states for breach of trust). United
States v. Tohono O’Odham, 563 U.S. 307 (2011), is included here although the Tribe lost the right to sue
119
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doctrines.133 Finally, in Patchak, the Court allowed non-Indian individuals to challenge the United
States’ decision to take land into trust for Indian tribes, 134 while in Carcieri v. Salazar 135 it
restricted the application of section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act to tribes under federal
jurisdiction as of 1934.136 The low rate of tribal wins in this area clearly indicates that the Court
is construing trust obligations narrowly,137 and does not want to extend general principles of trust
law to the Indian trust doctrine unless specifically mandated to do so by Congress.138
4. Cultural/Religious Rights: 3 cases.
There are only three cases in this category and, unfortunately, tribal interests lost every
one of them. Two of the cases were not concerned with any doctrines of federal Indian law,
Matal v. Tam, 139 and Employment Division v. Smith. 140 The third one did not allow Indian
practitioners to invoke the protection of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause to protect Sacred
Sites located on Federal land.141
C. THE RECORD WHEN THE CASES ARE CONSIDERED BASED ON RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
AND ALONG TIME LINES.
Although this is a subjective count, among the cases that are the most important in Federal
Indian Law from a precedential perspective, the survey indicates that there were 8 tribal victories
and 16 defeats. In other words, in the last thirty years, for every meaningful tribal victory, there
were two important tribal defeats. On the other hand, this means that tribal interests won
33.33% of these important cases which is a higher percentage of wins that the tribal average for
all cases (28%).
The tribal wins are an eclectic mix. They include Iowa Mutual v. Laplante (exhaustion of tribal
court remedies doctrine), 142 California v. Cabazon Band (state jurisdiction over gaming
preempted,) 143 Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield (ICWA), 144 Kiowa Tribe and Bay Mills (tribal
the United States in the Federal Court of Claims only because it had already filed a similar case in Federal
District Court.
133
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) (refusing to apply the trust doctrine to the
attorney-client privilege), and Dept. of Interior v. Klamath River Water Users, 530 U.S. 495 (2000) (refusing
to apply the trust doctrine to exceptions contained in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
134
Match-E-B-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 219 (2012).
135
555 U.S. 379 (2009).
136
Section 5, codified at 25 U.S.C 465, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to take land into trust for
the benefit of Indians.
137
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
138
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011).
139
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
140
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
141
See Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
142
480 U.S. 9 (1987).
143
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
144
490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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sovereign immunity),145 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band (Treaty interpretation,)146 and Nebraska v.
Parker (existence of Indian Country).147
The tribal losses include seven against state interests.148 Five of the cases that reduced tribal
sovereignty over non-members. 149 Three that involved the trust relationship. 150 One that
involved protection of an Indian sacred site.151
It is important to note that the overall percentage of tribal wins in the last thirty years, while
not great (28%), has increased since Professor Getches published his 2001 survey (23%). 152
However, if one looks at the percentages of tribal wins when the cases are divided into ten year
increments, the future looks brighter for tribal interests than it did previously. From the 198687 term to the 1996-97 term, the Court adjudicated 25 cases. Of these, 18.5 were tribal losses,
and 6.5 wins,153 amounting to a 26% tribal win rate. From the 1997-98 term to the 2006/07
term, the Court also heard 25 cases. The tribal interests lost 18 cases, while winning 7.154 This

Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, 523 U.S. 751 (1998), Michigan v. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. 2024
(2014).
146
526 U.S. 172 (1999).
147
Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
148
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 622 U.S. 520
(1998), Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996), Adoptive Couple V. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544
U.S. 197 (2005), Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 172 (1999).
149
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) , Nevada v. Hicks, 533
U.S. 353 (2001), Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
150
U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011), and
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
151
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
152
See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra at note 12.
153
The two most important wins for the tribes during that decade were California v. Cabazon Band, 480
U.S. 202 (1987) (No state jurisdiction over Tribal gaming) and Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30 (1989) (ICWA). Meaningful losses include Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (State
taxation), Strate v. A-1 Contractors, (No tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members) 520 U.S. 438 (1997),
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians), Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (State retained sovereign immunity in spite of IGRA,) and Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No constitutional protection for Indian sacred site
located on federal land).
154
Among the more meaningful tribal wins in this decade are Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies,
523 U.S. 751 (1998) (Tribal Sovereign Immunity), Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (Treaty
Rights), and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (Congressional power to overturn implicit
divestiture cases). Important losses include Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (No tribal civil jurisdiction
over non-members), Alaska v. Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (Land owned in Fee by Indians
pursuant to ANCSA not Indian Country), U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (No U.S. liability for
breach of trust in management of tribal natural resources), Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645
(2001)(No tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members), and Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)
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amounts to a 28% Tribal win rate. From the 2007/08 until the 2016/17 term, there was only 16
cases. 11 cases were tribal losses, and 5 tribal wins.155 This represents a 31.2 tribal win rate.
Although the tribal win rate increased in each successive decade, the positive or pro-tribal
trend is even more striking when one compares the first 15 years (1987-88 term until the 200001 term) with the last fifteen years (2001-02 term until the 2016-17 term.) The tabulation shows
that there were 43 cases decided in the first 15 years with the tribal interests losing 32.5 cases
while only winning 10.5 cases, representing a 24.4% rate of tribal wins. However, in the last
fifteen years, there were only 23 cases. However, of these 23 cases, Tribal interests won 8 cases
while losing 15. This represents a 34.7% rate of tribal wins and may indicate that, for the tribes,
the worst is behind them and there might indeed be a light at the end of this anti tribal
sovereignty tunnel. Besides the Court being more receptive to Indian tribes as the third sovereign
within our federalism, other factors may have contributed to this rather abrupt drop in the
number of cases decided as well as the increase in the percentage of tribal wins. One of these
factors could be the creation of the Tribal Supreme Court Project, a joint effort by the Native
American Rights Fund and the National Congress of American Indians, to more closely monitor
and control the kind of cases appealed to the Supreme Court by tribal interests.156
PART III: LOOKING FOR EQUILIBRIUM OR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY?
A. Evaluating Congressional response to the Court’s decisions, and the Court’s reaction to federal
legislation.

1.

Congressional response.

Congress is said to have “plenary power” over Indian Affairs, 157 and it is the Institution
the Constitution, mostly through the Indian Commerce Clause, vested with primacy over Indian
affairs.158 Recently, one scholar has argued that it is normatively right for Congress to take the
(Classification of Native Hawaiians for the purpose of voting in state elections are racial classifications
reviewed under strict scrutiny).
155
Meaningful tribal wins in this decade include Michigan v. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014)(Tribal
sovereign Immunity) and Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072 (2017 )which is included as an important
case because it may represent a turning point on how the Court determines whether Indian reservations
have been disestablished. Important tribal losses include Pains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land &
Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008)(no tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members), United States v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 564 U.S. 162 (2011)(Trust doctrine not applicable to interpret FOIA, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,
133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013) (Applicability of ICWA) and Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (section 5 of IRA only
applicable to tribes under federal jurisdiction as of 1934).
156
See Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes, supra at note 14, at p.......
157
For instance, in Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989), the Court stated “the
central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in
the field of Indian affairs.”
158
The Commerce Clause, Article II, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress
shall have the power ….to regulate Commerce…. with the Indian Tribes.” For a thorough look at the various
sources of congressional power over Indian Affairs, see Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce
Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012 (2015).
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leading role in Indian Affairs because it has the better institutional capacity to formulate sound
policies governing federal relations with Indian Nations, 159 while another one showed that
Congress is still very active in formulating federal Indian policy.160 Others have argued, however,
that Congress has ceded its leading role to the Court.161 Consistent with the views expressed in
Law and Equilibrium,162 it is true that Congress and the Court, and at times the Executive Branch,
are involved in a kind of dialogue with each other. As once stated by Justice Ginsburg:” judges…
participate in a dialogue with other organs of government.” 163 In this section, I analyze the
interrelationship between the Court and Congress in the field of Federal Indian Law to
understand the nature of the dialogue and determine if the Court has taken control over such
dialogue.164
Professor Matthew Fletcher has persuasively shown that, generally speaking, “modern
congressional statements” in Federal Indian policy support tribal self-government, tribal tax
authority and economic development, as well as tribal sovereign immunity and the development
of tribal courts.165 This section focuses only on legislation enacted specifically as a response to a
Supreme Court decision in order to evaluate Congressional willingness to retain primacy over
Indian affairs. This section is not a comprehensive survey. It is not pretending to be all inclusive
of all Indian legislation that may have been partially motivated or influenced by former Supreme
Court decisions. Although many tribe-specific legislation, whether it be land claims or water
rights settlements, are somewhat related to former Supreme Court decisions, this section does
not analyze all congressional legislation remotely related to Supreme Court decisions.
a. Indian Gaming.
Perhaps the most interesting case study involving the interaction between the legislative,
judicial, and Executive branches in the field of Indian Affairs is in the area of Indian gaming. As is
well documented, although Congress had been working on legislation to regulate Indian gaming,
it is only after the Court issued its 1987 decision in California v. Cabazon,166 that Congress was

See Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 85 U.
Colo. L. Rev 759 (2014).
160
Kirsten Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra at note 25 at p. at 148-149.
161
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 121 (2006).
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See Eskridge & Frickey Law as Equilibrium, supra at note 16.
163
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992). See also
Lawrence Friedman The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 Hasting
Const. L. Q. 93 (2000), Maimon Schwarzchild, Pluralism, Conversation, and Judicial Restraint, 95 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 961 (2001) (discussing when court decisions encourage democratic conversations with the other
branches.)
164
For a comprehensive study of the dynamic relationship between the Court’s decision and Congress on
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Yale L.J. 331 (1991).
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able to muster the political will to enact the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA).167
Eight years after IGRA was enacted into law, the Court reacted and declared the part of IGRA
allowing Tribes to sue States for failing to negotiate a tribal state compact in good faith
unconstitutional.168 While that decision did not generate a congressional reaction in the Indian
gaming area, the Executive Branch took up the challenge and enacted new regulations allowing
tribes to by-pass an assertion of state sovereign immunity by allowing them to ask the Secretary
of the Interior to issue Class III gaming procedures.169 So far, the power of the Secretary to issue
such procedures has been struck down by two circuits,170 but the Court has not yet decided to
take a case challenging the validity of the regulations.
b. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over non-Indians and non-member Indians.
Congress also reacted to the Court’s decisions to divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction over
non-member Indians and non-Indians. Congress enacted the so-called Duro Fix,171 overturning
the Court’s 1990 decision in Duro v. Reina.172 Congress eventually also partially overturned or
modified Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian tribe,173 by enacting the 2013 VAWA Amendments.174
There was a challenge to the Congress’s power to overturn or modify cases such as Duro
and Oliphant, but the Court in United States v. Lara ruled that these former decisions were based
on Federal common law and not constitutional law.175 Therefore, the results in such cases could
be modified by Congress.176 Whether non-members can be prosecuted in tribal courts without
the full protection of the United State Constitution has not yet been decided.177

For comprehensive analysis, see Franklin Ducheneaux, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Background
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c. Indian land Consolidation Act:178
On an issue of much less interest to the non-Indian world, the Court twice struck as
unconstitutional provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act allowing very small interests in
land owned by tribal members to escheat to their tribe under certain conditions.179 Each time,
the Congress reacted by enacting a new version of the law. The first ILCA was enacted in 1983.180
An amended version attempting to resolve the constitutional issues was enacted in 1984 but
declared unconstitutional in Babbitt v. Youpee.181 A third version was enacted in 2000, but was
replaced before it could be implemented by the 2004 American Indian Probate Reform Act.182
d. Overturning Patchak:
Following the Court’s decision in Mach-E-B-Nash-She-Wish v. Patchak, 183 which had
allowed a non-tribal member to challenge a decision by the Secretary of the Interior to transfer
some land to the tribe from fee to trust, Congress enacted the 1994 Gun Lake Trust Land
Reaffirmation Act.184 That Act attempts to overturn or, perhaps, moot the Court’s decision in
Patchak by reaffirming the Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust and directing the
dismissal of any action (future or pending) challenging such fee to trust transfer. The Court has
recently, however, granted cert to review the constitutionality of this legislation.185 The grant of
cert may seem unusual as the case only concerns a tribe specific statute. However, the legal
principles involved are important since they involve the power of Congress to affect the result
reached in previous court decisions. This case provides a good segue to the next section since it
discusses the Court’s reaction to other congressional legislation.
2. The Court’s Reaction to Congressional legislation:
This section evaluates the Court’s reaction to congressional legislation to determine if the
Court is looking for a political equilibrium and cares about reaching results consistent with the
positions of Congress on Indian issues.
a. Interpreting IGRA.
As stated earlier, the Court struck part of IGRA as unconstitutional in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida.186 The Court also interpreted IGRA as allowing federal taxation of tribal gaming revenues
Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA
L. Rev. 553 (2009).
178
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179
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in Chickasaw Nation v. United States. 187 While Seminole Tribe obviously upset the carefully
crafted balance reached by Congress between tribal and state interests in tribal gaming within
Indian Country, the decision was part of a much larger debate among the Justices concerning the
extent of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because it affected much more than just Indianspecific statutes, the decision was part of a much larger controversy between Congress and the
Court concerning the extent of Congressional power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the
States.
However, the refusal of the Court to allow Tribes to sue state official using the Ex Parte
Young doctrine reflects a profound disagreement with the Congressional policies enunciated in
IGRA.188 As I argued elsewhere, that policy revealed a congressional desire to include tribes into
a model of what some have termed cooperative federalism,
[f]ederal statutes in the new Tribal Self-Governance Era… have progressively adopted
what could be described as a compact model…. These statutes can be seen as
incorporating or integrating Indian tribes as sovereign political entities within “Our
Federalism” and creating what could be called a system of cooperative federalism
between the tribes and the federal government.189
Although I also pointed that IGRA was different from the typical cooperative federalism statute
in that it directly involved the states in the negotiation of compacts,190 I also believed that IGRA
could fit “in the concept of cooperative federalism, a concept which should be based on tri-lateral
agreements between the tribes, the federal government, and the states.”191
b. Interpreting ANCSA.
In Venetie, 192 the Court reacted to enactment of the 1971 Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA) by holding that land set aside for Native Corporations under the Act was
not Indian Country. Therefore, the State of Alaska could tax activities taking place on those lands.
The Court achieved this remarkable result by insisting that lands set aside by Congress for
dependent Indian Communities, such as Alaskan Native Villages, could only qualify as “Indian
Country” for the purpose of section 1151 if such lands also remained in control of the federal
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government.193 Because Native Alaskan villages held their lands in fee, the federal government
did not have complete control over such lands. Therefore, such lands could not qualify as Indian
Country.194
c. Interpreting ICWA:
Since its enactment in 1978, the Court has only interpreted the Indian Child Welfare Act
twice. From a pro tribal interpretation in Holyfield in 1988,195 the Court in 2013 came up with a
very narrow interpretation of the law in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.196 This new interpretation
severely limits the instances where biological Indian fathers could invoke the protection of ICWA
when intervene in adoption proceedings.
d. Interpreting section 5 of the IRA.
Section 5 allows the Secretary to transfer land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes.197
For years, the Secretary had construed that section as applying to all Indian tribes as long as such
tribes were under federal jurisdiction as of the date of each land transfer. At the urging of the
states, the Court in Carcieri gave a very narrow interpretation to the Indian Reorganization Act
restricting application of Section 5 to those tribes under federal jurisdiction as of 1934.198 The
Court was able to reach this result by surprisingly claiming that there was no ambiguity
whatsoever in the statute and, therefore, Chevron deference was not applicable.199 In doing so,
the Court set aside a thirty year old formal regulation of the Interior Department which had
interpreted the statute as only requiring that a tribe be under federal jurisdiction at the time the
land was transferred into trust.200
e. Indian Land Consolidation Act.
Although 18 U.S.C. 1151 defines what lands qualify as Indian Country for the purpose of criminal
jurisdiction, the definition has been applied to civil jurisdictional issues.
194
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As noted earlier, the Court struck down as unconstitutional parts of the Indian Land
Consolidation Act twice.201 It is interesting to note that in each of the five examples cited above,
the Court ruled against the tribal interests. However, of the five statutes, only the Indian Land
Consolidation Act generated a congressional response.202 This shows that if tribal interests are
not in direct conflict with the interests of states or important non-Indian interests, Congress is
ready and willing to correct Supreme Court decisions.203 The next sub-section makes this point
even clearer.
f. Interpreting the Indian Self Determination Act.
In 1988 and 1994, Congress amended the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975. 204 In
Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 205 the Supreme Court unanimously interpreted the 1988
Amendments as mandating the funding of “Contract Support Costs” associated with SelfDetermination contracts entered into between the United States and the tribes. Contract
support costs are “reasonable costs” that a federal agency would not have incurred, but which
tribes are incurring in managing such programs.206 Even though the 1988 Amendments provided
that funding under the Act shall be contingent on availability of appropriations and Congress had
not earmarked enough funds to cover all contract support costs, the Court reasoned that
Congress had still appropriated sufficient unrestricted funds to cover the full amount of those
contract support costs.
Aware of this problem, Congress later enacted Appropriation Bills with language providing
that contract support costs available to tribes should be capped at an amount “not to exceed”
amounts appropriated by Congress for this activity. Yet, in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo
Chapter,207 the Court, this time in a 5-4 decision, still held that the United States was obligated
to award each tribe the full amount of contract support costs negotiated in the previous
contracts.
Unlike previous statutory interpretation cases where the Court interpreted legislation
narrowly to restrict tribal rights, in this case, in spite of Congress’s attempts to restrict tribal
funding through specific language in Appropriation Bills, the Court stood firmly with the tribes
See discussion at notes 74-75.
Some may also question whether the “Supreme Court decisions in Irving and Youpee are actually antiIndian. See for instance Baca, 40 Years of U.S. Supreme Court, supra at note 14, classifying the two
decisions as Indian victories.
203
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204
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in upholding the contractual obligations of the United States. In effect, the Court put the onus
on Congress to amend the Indian Self-Determination Act one more time or be obligated to
fund all tribal contract support costs associated with Self-Determination contracts.
3. The Road not Taken.
Sometimes, congressional or judicial silence on an issue can speak as much as enacted
legislation and judicial decisions. In this section, I first enumerate five key issues where tribal
interests have failed to generate legislation. I then conclude by listing three areas where anti
tribal interests have not succeeded in motivating Congress to act.
a. Tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members:
As opposed to cases involving criminal jurisdiction, none of the civil jurisdiction cases
preventing tribal jurisdiction over non-members in Indian Country have been overturned. 208
Congressional silence and lack of any reaction, either for or against tribal jurisdiction in this area
speaks volume about either a lack of concern with such cases, or an inability to address such
issues through legislation. Perhaps the lack of concern can be explained by the fact that in many
of those cases, the tribal court plaintiff could sue the non-member in a state or federal court. On
the other hand, congressional inaction here can be explained by the fact that the non-tribal
members potentially affected by such legislation have considerable more lobbying power as a
group than non-members accused of committing crimes in Indian Country as was the case in Duro
and Oliphant.
In a recent article, Professor Berger proposed three reasons explaining the Court’s antitribal slant: First, the Justices are unfamiliar with how tribal governments operate. Secondly, the
Justices are concerned that non-members are not fully protected by the United States
Constitution when appearing in tribal courts. Finally, Indian nations are not seen by the Court as
truly sovereign governments in charge of governing their territories. 209 The same concerns
generated by unfamiliarity, lack of constitutional protection, and mixed feelings about tribal
sovereignty, could be operating also at the congressional level to dim any chances of restoring
tribal civil jurisdiction through legislation. However, it should be noted that although not enacted
as a direct reaction to any Supreme Court case, Congress did amend the major environmental
statutes to allow tribes to potentially be treated as States under those statutes. Such treatment
would allow tribes to regulate the activities of non-members in this area.210 Perhaps any future
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tribal efforts in this area should focus on specific areas of civil jurisdiction instead of painting with
a wider brush.211
b. Pre-empting state tax jurisdiction in Indian Country.
As stated earlier, 8 cases allowed states to tax activities on Indian reservations.212 The
Court has allowed such taxation by either slightly modifying its Indian preemption analysis,213 or
finding that the tax did not occur in Indian Country.214 In all these cases, the Court allowed state
taxation by finding that the legal incidence of the tax did not fall on the Indian tribes.215 Finally,
in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,216 the Court invoked the doctrine of laches to prevent
the Tribe from challenging a State tax because a successful challenge would otherwise upset the
long held and legitimate expectations of non-Indians.217
c. Enacting a Seminole fix.
Legislation is needed to resolve the ambiguities created by Seminole Tribe v. Florida.218 In
Seminole Tribe, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a section of IGRA allowing the tribes
to sue states in federal court for failure to negotiate a tribal state gaming compact on good
faith. 219 The unresolved question is whether the Secretary of the Interior can issue Class III
gaming procedures upon being petitioned to do so by a tribe whose lawsuit against a state was
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dismissed on account of sovereign immunity. Two Circuits have ruled that the Secretary cannot
issue such regulations.220 No amendment to IGRA on this issue seems to be forthcoming.221
d. Recognizing Native Hawaiians.
Although so far, Native Hawaiians lost both Supreme Court cases affecting their
interests,222 Congress tried but was unable to enact any kind of legislation recognizing Native
Hawaiians as a political group.223 However, on September 29, 2015, the Obama Administration,
through the Department of the Interior, announced that it was amending its regulations to allow
Native Hawaiians to apply for federal recognition as an Indian tribe.224
e. Overturning Carcieri.
So far, tribal efforts to enact a Carcieri Fix have been unsuccessful although Indian nations
may not be unitied in the effort to overturn the decision.225 Under Carcieri, in order to be eligible
to receive land into trust under the IRA’s section 5, a tribe had to be under federal jurisdiction in
1934.226
f. Repealing Section 5 of the IRA.
On the other hand, in spite of concerted efforts by the States to challenge implementation
of section 5 of the IRA,227 or declare the section unconstitutional,228 the Court never came close
to holding the Section unconstitutional. The Court did grant cert in Department of the Interior v.
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South Dakota,229 but proceeded on issuing a GVR, remanding the case for reconsideration to the
Secretary of the Interior without writing a substantial opinion. 230 Congress on the other hand,
did amend the Indian Reorganization Act in 1988 to allow tribes who had initially rejected the Act
to be able to benefit from Section 5.231
g. Abrogating tribal Sovereign Immunity
In Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies,232 the Court strongly implied that Congress
should consider restricting the scope of tribal sovereign immunity.233 Yet, after considering the
issue in connection with enactment of the Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts
Encouragement Act of 2000,234 Congress opted against any major revisions to the doctrine.235
h. Amending ICWA.
Anti-ICWA interest groups efforts to amend the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),236 have
also gone nowhere, legislatively speaking. Although Bills to amend ICWA have been introduced,
Congress has so far not enacted any new amendments to this legislation.237 On the same subject,
even though many have and continue to challenge some sections of ICWA as being
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unconstitutional,238 the Supreme Court has never granted cert to any such cases.239 It should be
noted, however, that in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Court stated that parts of ICWA would
raise equal protection issues if the interpretation of the South Carolina Supreme Court was
upheld.240
Conclusion to Part III A:
In a recent Article analyzing in depth the actions of Congress concerning Indians, Professor
Kirsten Carlson found that Indian tribes were surprisingly adept at persuading Congress to enact
legislation favorable to tribal interests.241 As the Patchak legislation shows,242 this is undoubtedly
true when it comes to getting Congress to enact tribe specific bills or legislation not opposed by
states or powerful non-Indian interests. Otherwise, the only major pan-tribal successes involving
congressional reaction to Supreme Court decisions in the last thirty years have been the
enactment of IGRA, the Duro Fix, and the 2013 VAWA Amendments. There have been, of course,
many other tribal legislative successes. But such successes, like for instance, the Tribal Law &
Order Act, 243 have not been the result of a direct congressional reaction to a Supreme Court case.
Tribal interests, however, have been more adept at preventing anti-tribal bills from being
enacted into law. Thus, major pro-tribal legislation like the IRA, IGRA, and ICWA have not been
amended in a way adverse to tribal interests. However, the same thing could be said of anti tribal interests capabilities to stymie pro-tribal legislation. It is telling that Congress was able to
revisit the ILCA twice and has made numerous amendments to the ISDA, yet tribal legislative
efforts to fix IGRA in the wake of Seminole Tribe, reaffirm tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, or preempt state taxation in Indian Country, have all been stalled.
The record confirms that it is much easier to kill rather than enact legislation.244 Many have
written about congressional gridlock and the Court is, of course, aware of this phenomenon.245
In the next section of this Article, I argue that this awareness has emboldened the Court to use
judge-made law to promote its own agenda and policies in Indian Country without any fears of
upsetting any equilibrium that may have been reached with Congress.
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B. Looking for a different kind of equilibrium: The Court’s use of Federal Common law:
As stated earlier, the Court uses Federal common law more than any other type of law in
its Indian law jurisprudence. Moreover, the Court’s most active use of federal common law is to
protect non-members from tribal jurisdiction and promote state jurisdiction inside Indian
reservations. In this section, I argue that rather than looking for an equilibrium with Congress,
the Court is using federal common law to impose its own version of what the equilibrium
between tribal and non-tribal interests should look like.
The Court’s inordinate reliance on Federal common law for these purposes shows that
the Court does not believe that Congress can be counted on to protect the interests of nonmembers or states in Indian Country.246 In a non-Federal Indian law context, scholars have noted
that the Court’s new vigor to protect norms of Federalism is based on a belief that Congress does
not always have the states’ interest foremost in mind when enacting legislation.247 Although
there is no data supporting the ineptness of Congress to look after the interests of states and
non-members in Indian Country, there is legislative gridlock generally speaking. 248 It would
therefore not be surprising for the Court to think that this gridlock may extend to controversial
issues in Indian Country.
This perceived inability or unwillingness of Congress to protect the interests of states and
non-members has pushed the Court to reverse certain common law presumptions that used to
govern the field of Indian Affairs. Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, the Court during the
Rehnquist years adopted a “dependency” paradigm for the incorporation of tribes into our
federalist system. 249 Under that paradigm, tribes were not being incorporated under a third
sphere of sovereignty but were “dependent” on Congress for all their political rights. In other
words, the Court’s jurisprudence was evolving towards a position that would require the
existence of tribal power to be somehow confirmed in treaties or legislation.250 In addition, the
Court was moving towards a position requiring Congressional intent to preempt state jurisdiction
in Indian country to be clearly indicated. 251 Thus, instead of looking for Congress to act
affirmatively to protect states and non-member interests, the Court was putting the burden on
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Congress to confirm tribal power and clearly establish its intent to pre-empt state jurisdiction in
Indian Country.252
Although Congress has adopted broad policies favoring tribal self-government, the Court’s
effort to impose its own agenda through federal common law has been facilitated by the fact
that Congress has rarely addressed general conflicts involving tribal and state claims to power on
Indian reservations. As I have argued elsewhere, this lack of precise congressional direction on
state taxation and tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members has enabled the Court through the
use of formalism to formulate rigid rules from old cases in order to justify its decisions favoring
States rights and disallowing tribal jurisdiction over non-members. 253 The typical formalist
analysis uses a “rule” derived from authoritative text. Functionalism, on the other hand, applies
“standards” to resolve a given conflict.254 The use of formalism instead of functionalism has
enabled the Court to hide its policy choices behind such rigid rules. Using a functional approach
in federal Indian law would at least force the Court to explain why its holdings are congruent with
current congressional policies.255
As the previous section demonstrated, the Court feels emboldened to use federal common
law to divest tribes of jurisdiction over non-members and allow state tax jurisdiction in Indian
Country because it thinks that the chances of Congress reacting to anti tribal decisions favoring
States’ rights or the right of powerful non-Indian interests, are extremely small. While I have no
qualms with the right of the Court to use federal common law, the more difficult question is
whether the Court’s formulation of its common law rules is legitimate. Although there are very
few limits, if any, on the power of federal courts to devise rules of federal common law,256 the
fashioning of rules of decision should be, in one way or another, tied either to congressional
policies, 257 or to values emanating from the Constitution. 258 As the Court noted, statutes
establish policies that
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become itself a part of our law, to be given its appropriate weight not only in matters of
statutory construction but also in those of decisional law…This appreciation of the
broader role played by legislation in the development of the law reflects the practices of
common law courts from the most ancient times. As Professor Landis has said “much of
what is ordinarily regarded as ‘common law’ finds its sources in legislative enactment.259
Commenting on the Court’s use of Federal Common Law, Professor Frickey once stated
that the “unstated assumption” underlying these federal common law cases was that even
though Congress has not spoken on the issues being decided, the Court is presuming that it is
merely following the “wishes of Congress.”260 Professor Frickey concluded, however, that there
was no evidence supporting such a judicial presumption.261 Other scholars have noted that when
it comes to federal Indian common law, the decisional law is divorced from current congressional
policies.262 As stated by Professor Frank Pommersheim “In a sense, the Court has become the
ultimate organ for formulating Indian policy in contemporary law. This raises a quintessential
separation of powers issue, with the Court usurping the constitutional role of Congress to make
law and formulate policy.”263
Native Americans have been described at various times as the “forgotten Americans,” or
the “vanishing Indians.” There was a time when almost all Indian tribes were economically
powerless and had very little or no impact on the political and economic life of the United States.
These times are over: Whether it is because of the success of Indian casino gaming,264 or other
aspects of tribal economic development, 265 Indian issues are no longer on the backburner.266
How Indian tribes conduct their politics and handle their business affairs matters to the nonIndian world.267 Because of this new reality, the Court may be in the process of adjusting the
legal landscape.268 In looking for an equilibrium between tribal and non-tribal interests, the Court
directly implied from the constitutional structure or if they are necessary to further a basic structure of
the constitutional scheme.)
259
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may be adjusting the rules to ensure what it (subjectively) considers a level playing field between
the tribes on one hand and the states and non-Indians on the other. Controversial decisions in
cases such as City of Sherrill, and Plains Commerce Bank, may reflect a knee jerk reaction to the
tribes’ newfound political and economic power. A good example of the Court’s desire to create
a new level playing field is its recent decision in Lewis v. Clark. 269 In that case, the Court refused
to extend the tribe’s sovereign immunity to a tribal employee alleged to have committed a tort
off the reservation but still within the scope of his employment. In coming to its decision, the
Court took into account whether similar state employees would have enjoyed the State’s
sovereign immunity in such situations.270
CONCLUSION
The Court’s continued reliance on federal common law doctrines to divest tribes of
sovereignty or allow state jurisdiction in Indian Country, is unfortunate and undermining
congressional policies favoring tribal self-government and economic self-sufficiency. However,
there are reasons for tribes to be optimistic. Congressional response to the Supreme Court Indian
law jurisprudence, while not overly active, has not been detrimental to tribal interests. Although
enacting pro Indian pan-tribal legislation, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act, is definitely harder
than it used to be,271 individual tribes have continued to be successful in enacting tribal specific
legislation.272 Moreover, the overall percentage of tribal wins in the last thirty years while not
great (28%), has increased with each decade.273
In conclusion, I concur with Professor Berger that there are reasons for Indian nations to
be optimistic.274 The overall trend in the cases does indicate that the Court is more willing now
to support the integration of Indian nations as the third sovereigns within our federalist system.
The Court, however, may be getting around to accepting the position of tribes as the third
sovereigns within our federalism. A recent Supreme Court decision indicates a more positive
attitude towards tribal sovereignty than the one prevailing during the Rehnquist years. Thus, in
a non-Indian case discussing the inherent sovereignty of Puerto Rico, the Court declared per
Justice Kagan
Originally, this Court has noted “the tribes were self-governing sovereign political
communities possessing (among other capacities) the “inherent power to prescribe laws
for their members and to punish infractions of those laws.” After the formation of the
United States, the tribes became domestic dependent nations, subject to the plenary
137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017).
Id., at 1290-91 (After summarizing the rules denying extension of state sovereign immunity in such
circumstances, the Court stated “There is no reason to depart from these general rules in the context of
tribal sovereign immunity.”)
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control of Congress… But unless and until Congress withdraws a tribal power—including
the power to prosecute—the Indian community retains that authority in its earliest form.
The ultimate source of a tribe’s power to punish tribal offenders” thus lies in its
“primeval” or, at any rate, “pre-existing” sovereignty: A tribal prosecution, like a State’s
is “attributable in no way to any delegation… of federal authority.275

Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016)(holding that for the purposes of the double
jeopardy clause, Puerto Rico did not have any inherent sovereignty separate from that of the United
States.) Although there were two dissenters, only Justice Thomas objected to the quoted language.
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